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ESTIMATING THE AGE-PRODUCTIVITY PROFILE USING 
LIFETIME EARNINGS 
ABSTRACT 
Understanding how productivity varies with  age is important for a 
variety of  reasons.  A decline in productivity with  age implies that aging 
societies must increasingly depend on  the labor supply of  the young and 
middle age.  It also means that policies designed to keep the elderly in the 
work force, while potentially good for the elderly, may decrease overall 
productivity.  A  third implication is that, absent government intervention, 
employers may not be willing to hire the elderly for the same compensation 
as younger workers.  Labor economists are particularly interested in the 
relationship of productivity and age because it can help  test alternative 
theories of  the labor market. 
This  paper assumes risk neutral employers and estimates the age— 
productivity relationship using the first order condition that the present 
expected value of total compensation equals the present expected value of 
productivity; workers hired at  different ages have  different present 
expected values of total compensation, and,  correspondingly, different 
present expected values of productivity.  Hence, if one psrameterizes the 
age—productivity relationship, the parameters of this relationship can be 
identified from information on  how total present expected compensation 
varies with  age. 
The data in  the study are earnings histories for over three hundred 
thousand employees of a Fortune 1000 corporation covering the period 1969— 
1983.  While the results may  be  subject to several biases and should be 
viewed cautiously, they are fairly striking.  For each of  the five sex— 
occupation groups, productivity falls with age.  For young workers, 
compensation (earnings plus pension accrual) is below productivity and for 
older workers compensation exceeds productivity.  For several worker groups 
the discrepancy between compensation and productivity is very  substantial. 
In  addition to confirming some features of contrsct theory, the results 
lend support to  the bonding models of Becker and Stigler and Lazear which 
suggest that firms use the age—earnings profile as an  incentive device. 
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Understanding how produttiviry varies with age is important fot a 
variety of  reasons.  A decline in  productivity with age implies that aging 
sotieties must intreasingly depend on the labor supply of  the young and 
middle age.  It also  means that policies designed to keep the elderly in the 
work force, while potentially good for the elderly, may decrease overall 
productivity.  A third implication is that,  absent government intervention, 
employers may not be willing to hire the elderly for the same compensation 
as younger workers. 
Labor economists are particularly interested in the relationship of 
productivity and age because it can help test alternative theories of  the 
labor market.  The simplest such theory is the spot market theory in  which 
workers are paid, at least annually, their marginal product.  However, there 
appear to  he few, if  any,  economists who view the spot market theory as 
reasonable.  My  research with  David Wise (Kotlikoff and  Wise; 1985,  l987a, 
l987b) presents fairly strong evidence against the spot market theory;  we 
demonstrated that most defined benefit pension plans induce very  sharp 
discontinuities with age in  vested pension accrual.  Under the spot market 
theory there should be  offsetting sharp discontinuities at these ages in 
wage  compensation.  Such offsetting wage discontinuities are not, however, 
evident in  the data. 
In contrast to  the spot market theory, contract theories of labor 
markets imply only a present value relationship  between compensation and 
productivity.  Consider, for example, the contracts that would  he  written by 
risk neutral employers.  In these contracts, although earnings in any single 
year can exceed or be  less than that year's productivity, the present 
expected value of  the worker's output will equal the present expected velue 
of  her compensation. Different contract theories have different implications concerning the 
relationahip of productivity and wages as the worker ages.  One such theory 
is the specific human capital model of Mincer (1964)  and Becker  (1971).  It 
suggests that if  firms sre free to fire older workers, the age—wage profile 
will  be  structured such that earnings exceed productivity when  young and 
vice versa when  old.  On  the other hand, in  Lazear's (1979,  1981) agency 
model of  worker shirking, the worker receives less than her marginal product 
when young, with  the difference paid out in the form of wages, accrued 
pension benefits, or  severance pay in excess of  the marginal product when 
old. 
The efficiency wage models of  Harris and Todaro  (1970),  Stofft  (1984), 
Yellen (1984), Stiglitz and Shapiro (1984),  end Bulow and Summers  (1985) 
represent a third view of  the labor market.  These models stress the payment 
of  above market clearing wages, rather than the shape of the age— 
compensation profile as an incentive device.  While there is equilibrium 
unemployment in these models, they, like the spot market theory, predict 
that workers are paid  their marginal products at each age over the work 
span. 
The evidence to date on the age—productivity relationship is limited 
and mixed.  The findings for older workers of  Abraham and Madoff  (1981) that 
pay increases although indices of productivity decline, suggest wages in 
excess of  marginal products toward the end of the work span.  Lazear and 
Moore  (1983)  report that the earnings profiles of  the self—employed are 
flatter than those of  employees, also suggesting earnings in excess of 
productivity among older employees.  Kahn and Lang (1986),  in  contrast, 
examine responses to questions concerning desired hours of  work;  they point 
out that older workers, with  earnings in  excess of their marginal products, —4— 
are likely to be  hours—constrained by  their employers and, therefore, desire 
to work more.  The opposite would be true if earnings of  older workers is 
below their marginal products.  Kahn and Lang's empirical findings support 
the view that marginal productivity exceeds earnings for older workers. 
This paper assumes risk neutral employers and estimates the age— 
productivity relationship using the first order condition that the presenr 
expected value of  total compensation equals the present expected value of 
productivity; workers hired at different ages have different present 
expected values of total compensation and,  correspondingly, different 
present expected values of productivity.  Hence, if one parameterizes the 
age—productivity relationship, the parameters of  this relationship can be 
identified from information on how total present expected compensation 
varies with age. 
The data in  the study are earnings histories for over three hundred 
thousand employees of  a Fortune 1000 corporstion covering the period 1969 — 
1983.  While the firm's name can not be  disclosed, the firm is involved 
primarily in sales.  These data are advantageous  not only because one can 
control for the firm, but also because one can determine precisely the 
accrued pension compensation arising under the firm's defined benefit 
pension plan.  At particular ages and amounts of  service, pension 
compensation in this firm is an important  component of  total compensation. 
The results indicate that productivity declines with  age and that 
workers are paid  more than they produce when old to offset being paid  less 
than they produce when  young.  For some sex—occupation groups the difference 
between productivity and compensation at  young and old ages is very 
sizeable.  The results support the bonding models of  Becker and  Stigler 
(1974) and Lazear  (1979,1981)  as opposed to the efficiency wage models cited —5— 
above and the Becker — Mincer  human capital models.  The  results are, 
however,  compatible with more general efficiency wage models (Akerlof and 
Katz, 1956). 
There are,  however, a number of reasons for viewing these results 
cautiously.  First the analysis assumes that the form of  contracts remained 
constant over the sample period.  Second, the probability of  remaining 
employed is treated as exogenous and time invariant, rather than  an 
endogenous choice of  the employer.  Third,  the analysis assumes the age— 
productivity relationship has remained constant over a 16 year period. 
Fourth, the results may be subject to selectivity bias if (1)  different 
workers within an occupation group have contracts that differ in  ways  other 
than their initial  wage and (2)  if the composition of  workers who join  or 
leave the firm at  particular ages is correlated with  the characteristics of 
the contract. 
The paper continues as follows.  The next section, II,  presents the 
basic methodology.  Section III presents the data.  Section IV examines the 
results, and Section V states conclusions and suggests additional research. 
Section II.  Methodology 
Consider a firm whose concave  production function depends on  capital 
and labor.  Labor input is assumed to differ across workers only in  terms of 
effective units;  i.e.,  the labor input of  one worker is a perfect substitute 
for that of  any other, but the amount of  effective labor units is different 
for esch worker.  The firm is assumed to have full knowledge of the worker's 
productivity at  the time he  or she is hired.  Let Y,  Lt, end Kt  stand for 
output, labor, and capital in  year t, respectively.  The concave production 
function is: —6— 
(1)  "t  — F(Lt,Kt) 
where 
s  75 
(2)  Lc  E  E Nj,a q(a+s—j,a,s) h(a+s—j,a,s) 
j—s—57 a—18 
In (2),  total labor input at time s, L5,  equals the sum of  the labor input 
of workers hired this year and in  past years.  If  18 and  75  are the minimum 
and maximum ages of  workers, respectively, then the firm  at  time s  has no 
workers hired before s—Si.  The term Nj,a stands for the number of  workers 
hired in  year  j  at  initial hiring age a.  Of  course, not all of  the workers 
hired in the past  stay with  the firm.  The term q(a+s—j,a,s) denotes the 
fraction of  those workers who are currently age a+s—j, who joined the firm 
at  age a, and who have  remained with the firm through year  s.  Finally, 
h(a+s—j.a,s) denotes the productivity in year s of  workers age a+s—j who 
joined the firm at  age a. 
The expected present value of real profits of  the firm  at  time t, 'c 
is given by: 
i5  t  is 
(3)  t  — Et  £ P5Y5(L5,K5)R5t  — £  £ Ns,aes,aRt  —  £  £  Ns,aDs,a, 
s—t  s—t a—lB  s—t—5i a—l8 where Et  is the expectstion operator at time t,  P5 is the real price of 
output in  year  s, R is one over one plus the real interest rate, ea,a is the 
present (discounted to year s) expected value of  compensation payments to 
workers hired in  year  s at age a,  and 0s,a is the present expected value of 
cemaining compensation payments to workers hired at  age a in year  s<t. 
Equation (3)  states that the present expected value of  profits equals the 
present expected value of output, less the present expected value of 
compensation paid  to current and future  hires, and less the present expected 
value of  remaining compensation paid to  past hires,  At  time t the future 
values of  P5  are uncertain; as a consequence the future values of Y  are 
also uncertain. 
In  maximizing  the present expected  value of  profits firms are 
constrained to structure compensation  payments to provide workers with 
competitive levels of  expected utility.  In  addition, they may face anti— 
ahirking constraints, requiring that they atructure the time path  of 
compensation to reduce or eliminate  worker malfeasance.  Regardless of  these 
side constraints, the first order condition for hiring  workers age a at time 
t is chat  the present expected value of  marginal output equals the present 
expected value of  compensation; i.e., 
t+(75—a) 
(4)  Et  E P5(&Y5/6L5)q(a+s_t,a,t)h(a+a_t,a,s)R5t 
— eta 
s—t 
The present expected value of  compenaation of a  worker hired in year t 
at age a can be expressed in tens  of the time path  of future annual —8— 
compensation.  -  Let w(i,a,s) stand for the compensation paid  to workers who 
are age  i  in  year s and who joined the firm at  sge a.  Then: 
t+75—a 
(5)  eta  —  E  w(a+s_t,a,t)q(a+s_t,a,t)R5_t 
s—t 
While  the  length  of  employment is uncertain, the assumption of  risk neutral 
employers and risk  averse workers, whose productive characteristics are 
fully known by the firm,  implies that the actual compensation payments are 
specified with certainty at the time the  worker joins the firm. 
Assuming the structure of  the compensation contract is constant through 
time, the ratio of  compensation at  age i+l to compensation at age i is 
independent of time;  i.e., 
(6)  w(i+l,a,t)/w(i,a,t—l) — p(i+l,a) 
If the age—productivity relationship and the probabilities of  departure are 
also  assumed to be  time invariant, the third arguments in  the functions 
h(  ,  ,  )  and  q(  ,  ,  )  can be  dropped. 
Letting 8  — P5(6Y5/6L5),  equations (4),  (5),  and (6)  imply: 
t+75—a  t+75—a 
(7)  w(a,a,t) S  (+5_t,a)q(a+s_t,a)R5t  —  5  Et 95q(a+s_t,a)h(sfs_t,a)R5t 
s—t  s—t —9-— 
The assumption of  myopic expectations permits wtiting Et95 — 0  and  (7)  can 
be  expressed as: 
t+75—s 
(8)  C(a,t) —  S  q(a+s_t,a)h(a+s_t,a)R5t  — GtH(a), 
s—t 
where C(a,t) stands for the left hand  side  of (7)  and equals the present 
expected compensation of a  worker hired at  age a in  year  t. 
To gain  some intuition about the relationship between the C(  ,  )s  and 
the h(  ,  )s,  consider the simple tase in  which there is a  constant 
probability  p of  staying each year  with  the firm,  i.e., qUa) — pia,  that 
depends only on  age,  i.e.,  h(i,a) — VU),  and that 8t equals unity. 
In  this case C(a,r) —  C*(a),  and a little manipulation of  (8)  leads to: 
(9)  v(a) — C*(a) —  pRC*(a+l) 
and 
(10)  v(a+l) — v(a)  — {C*(a+1)  — C*(a)J  —  pR[C*(a+2)  — C*(a+i)} 
From  (9),  if pR  equaled unity, v(a) would  just equal the difference in  the 
present expected value of  compensation of  workers hired et  age a  and  at  age 
a+l.  In  this case the present expected value of compensation of  younger 
hires would always exceed that of  older hires  (assuming positive values of 
v(s) at  all ages).  If, on  the other hand, the annual probability of -21- 
Table 4  Levels of Total Compensation and Productivity 
Asswsing a 6 Percent Interest  Rate 
Males  Females 
Office Workers  Salesmen  Managers  Office Workers  Saleswomen 
2R  Q  £Q 
35  23290  33020  33218  33721  18027  39033  22616  33993  32836  33951 
36  24705  33872  33777  34559  20268  39767  24492  34826  32179  34785 
37  26023  34659  34258  35327  22480  40394  26255  35587  31794  35547 
38  27249  35375  34659  36020  24632  40905  27890  36269  31613  36231 
39  28392  36016  34983  36631  26699  41294  29385  36869  31584  36833 
40  29459  36577  35230  37156  28661  41553  30736  37381  31663  37347 
41  30460  37052  35403  37591  30507  41676  31940  37799  31816  37768 
42  31402  37437  35504  37928  32228  41655  32999  38118  32014  38090 
43  32291  37728  35538  38165  33820  41483  33916  38334  32234  38309 
44  38027  37918  41751  38294  39931  41154  39843  38440  37954  38419 
45  34683  38003  36253  38312  37418  40659  36157  38431  33411  38414 
46  35925  37979  36472  38213  39263  39993  37225  38303  33926  38290 
47  36825  37840  36405  37992  40567  39148  37830  38050  34253  38042 
48  37686  37581  36276  37643  41746  38117  38330  37666  34549  37664 
49  38522  37198  36104  37162  42813  36892  38751  37147  34833  37151 
50  39282  36686  35834  36543  43719  35468  39057  36487  35057  36497 
51  40176  36039  35584  35781  44753  33836  39451  35681  35350  35697 
52  40867  35253  35142  34872  45409  31990  39626  34724  35535  34747 
53  34323  34599  33809  45884  29922  39737  33610  35696  33641 
54  41983  33244  33933  32589  46138  27626  39784  32334  35833  32374 
55  71120  32010  58669  31204  77399  25095  67896  30892  61738  30940 
56  46071  30618  34550  29651  49446  22320  42811  29277  38965  29334 
57  46052  29062  33026  27925  48668  19297  42525  27484  38859  27551 
58  45142  27338  30691  26019  46652  16016  41518  25509  38152  25586 
59  43832  25440  27962  23930  43994  12472  40315  23345  37246  23433 
60  39923  23363  23095  21651  38351  8657  36845  20988  34203  21088 
61  35391  21104  18005  19178  31940  4563  33039  18433  30773  18544 
62  33111  18655  14645  16505  27796  185  31530  15674  29244  15797 
63  30599  16014  11692  13628  23317  -4484  29976  12705  27494  12842 
64  31674  13174  10923  10540  22178  -9453  31924  9523  28628  9673 





































































































































































































Table 3  Age-Productivity  Regressions Assuming a 6 Percent Interest Rate 
Males  Females 
Variables  Office Workers  Salesmen  Manaeers  Office  Workers  Saleswomen 
a2  50.33035  38.34286  97.88788  2772098  45.18319 
(1.105)  (0.618)  (3.336)  (0.426)  (9.696) 
-0.74407  -0.57257  -1.57805  -0.41612  -0.67761 
(0.1668-1)  (O.942E-2)  (O.561E-l)  (O.645E-2)  (0.145) 
071  - .0095057  0.02396  .00345915  -0.05147  -0.67456 
(O.304E-1)  (O.219E-l)  (O.452E-l)  (0.2108-1)  (0.244) 
072  0.04380  0.01887  -0.02484  0.03571  -0.52057 
(O.291E-l)  (O.222E-1)  (0.454E-l)  (0.208E-1)  (0.238) 
073  0.03226  -0.01416  -0.02531  0.05581  -0.64611 
(0.2858-1)  (0.220E-1)  (0.451E-1)  (0.190E-1)  (0.229) 
074  -0.02681  -0.04849  -0.12467  .00717999  -0.56458 
(0.288E-1)  (O.204E-1)  (O.416E-1)  (0.1888-1)  (0.221) 
D75  0.02725  -0.04625  -0.07275  0.09147  -0.48456 
(0.281E-1)  (0.196E-1)  (0.4118-1)  (0.185E-l)  (0.219) 
D76  -0.03789  -0.06847  -0.05845  0.03307  -0.42320 
(0.2618-1)  (0.191E-1)  (0.4118-1)  (0.173E-1  (0.217) 
D77  -0.03253  -0.08741  -0.05446  0.08427  -0.43532 
(0.256E-1)  (O.184E-1)  (O.406E-1)  (0.1718-1)  (0.215) 
D78  -0.07344  -0.17232  -0.05886  0.03560  -0.53027 
(0.257E-1)  (0.179E-1)  (0.396E-1)  (0.1688-1)  (0.215) 
079  -0.13934  -0.26782  -0.22318  -0.01083  -0.60448 
(0.258E-1)  (O.181E-1)  (O.409E-l)  (0.1688-1)  (0.215) 
080  -0.15293  -0.25847  -0.16289  :0099359  -0.57778 
(O.265E-1)  (0.181E-1)  (O.389E-1)  (0.167E-1)  (0.215) 
081  -0.16023  -0.30280  -0.26470  0.01889  -0.61783 
(O.252E-1)  (0.1798-1)  (0.389E-1)  (0.l65E-1)  (0.215) -20- 
D82  -0.04405  -0.36594  -0.21860  0.06838  -0.63699 
(0.266E-1)  (0.176E-1)  (0.391E-1)  (0.174E-1)  (0.215) 
D83  -0.17587  -0.41658  -0.14946  -0.01804  -0.69837 
(0.271E-1)  (0.174E-1)  (0.446E-1)  (0.173E-1)  (0,215) 
Number 
of  Obser.  7083  19696  2116  20753  3217 
R2  .276  .075  .204  - .134  - .086 —18— 
Section IV.  Estimates of  the Age—Productivity Profile 
Table 3 presents the regression results from estimating (11') assuming 
a 6 percent interest rate.  In the regression observations on  workers hired 
only during the years 1970 through 1983 are included, since pension accrual 
for workers hired prior to 1969 could not be determined.  All of  the age— 
squared and age—cubed coefficients reported in  the Table are highly 
significant.  MAny  of the year dummies are also significant, suggesting that 
the modeling of  expectations of  future Os may  be  important.  The regression 
coefficients are little affected by  the choice of  interest rate;  the 
regressions were  repeated assuming interest rates of  both  3 percent and 9 
percent, and the coefficients are very  similar to those reported in Table 3. 
Figures 2 through 6 are based on  the six percent interest rate 
regressions of  Table 3.  They  present the age—productivity profiles (dashed 
lines) predicted by the regressions for the five sex—occupation groups for 
workers hired initially at age 35.  They  also present the ag—tota1 
compensation profile (solid lines) implied by  the smoothed p(  ,  )s and the 
pattern of  pension accrual.  The age 35  initial level of productivity and 
compensation are chosen to insure that both the present expected value of 
compensation and the present expected value of marginal product equal 
$500,000.  Table 4 presents the values of  compensation and  productivity 
profiles presented in Figures 2 through 6. 
While productivity initially rises with  age in each diagram, it 
eventually starts declining with age.  For male office workers productivity 
peaks at  age 45  and declines thereafter.  For this group age 65 productivity 



































































































































































































Table 1  Smoothed q(  )  Functions by  Occupation—Sex Group 
Age 
Age of  Hire  __21...  _..i....  _J±.....  _i.....  _...L 
Male  Office 
20  .461  .303  335  .218  .024 
30  .699  .485  .215  .017 
40  .791  .334  .029 
50  .681  .092 
60  .435 
Female Office 
20  .472  .300  .289  .144  .010 
30  .688  .420  .142  .007 
40  .792  .298  .018 
50  .735  .101 
60  .543 
Salesmen 
20  .286  .084  .049  .020  .002 
30  .420  .149  .054  .007 
40  .496  .145  .021 
50  .480  .077 
60  .379 
Saleswomen 
20  .301  .053  .015  .004  .001 
30  .373  .083  .023  .005 
40  .431  .105  .026 
50  .467  .111 
60  .474 
Male  Managers 
20  .622  .505  .488  .215  .013 
30  .885  .768  .343  .024 
40  .900  .431  .038 
50  .657  .079 
60  .321 —17— 
Table 2  Smoothed p(  )  Functions by  Occupation—Sex Group 
Age 
Age of  Hire  25  35  45  55  65 
Male Office 
20  1.071  1.028  1.028  1.017  1.005 
30  1.047  1.021  .998  .968 
40  1.030  1.003  .957 
50  1.019  .973 
60  1.014 
Female Office 
20  1.047  1.027  1.030  1.007  .994 
30  1.048  1.008  .990  .985 
40  1.043  .999  .987 
50  1.034  .998 
60  1.019 
Salesmen 
20  1.016  .976  .987  .985  .827 
30  1.010  .992  .970  .840 
40  1.004  .975  .872 
50  1.000  .924 
60  .996 
Saleswomen 
20  1.042  1.072  1.076  1.124  1.128 
30  1.012  1.023  1.023  1.005 
40  .996  .980  .943 
50  .992  .942 
60  .962 
Male Managers 
20  1.090  1.054  1.062  .991  .770 
30  1.079  1.026  .983  .852 
40  1.068  1.005  .925 
50  1.057  .990 
60  1.047 —14— 
accrual prior to age 55.  After age 55 the accrual is much smaller and, 
indeed, can become negative. 
The q(  ,  )s used  in constructing catj and the variables in  equations 
(10') and (13) were calculated separately for each of  the five age— 
occupation groups in the following manner.  First,  the fraction of  workers 
at a given age and initial age of  hire  who remain in the firm from one year 
to the next was calculated.  Next, these annual survival hazards were 
smoothed using a third order polynomial in  age, age of  hire, and interaction 
terms.  Finally, the cumulative survival probabilities, the q(  ,  )s,  were 
computed based  on  the smoothed annual survival probabilities. 
The (  ,  )s  in the above discussion have stood for the growth  in total 
compensation, including pension compensation; but in order to determine the 
course of pension compensation, one needs first to know  the course of 
nonpension compensation.  Hence, the function *( ,  ), which gives the 
growth in  nonpension compensation, was first estimated by regressing 
observed growth rates in  earnings, excluding pension compensation, against a 
third order polynomial in  age, age of hire, and interaction terms.  The 
initial  wage  together with  the smoothed p( ,  )s provide a path of 
nonpension compensation that can  be  used to calculate the path of  pension 
accrual.  The path  of  nonpension plus pension compensation is then used  to 
form the present expected value of total compensation, the 
Tables 1  and 2 present, respectively, the smoothed q(  ,  )  and p*(  , 
functions  for the different occupation—sex groups at selected ages and ages 
of  hire.  Table 1 indicates very  substantial differences in job survival 
rates across the five groups; 34.3 percent of male managers who hire on at 
age 30  are predicted to remain with  the firm 25  years later.  For male and —15— 
female office workers the comparable percentages are 21.5 and 14.2, 
respectively.  For salesmen and saleswomen the respective percentages are 
5.4 and 2.3.  The Table also demonstrates that workers hired at  older ages, 
at  least through age 50,  have larger  probabilities  of remaining in  the fin 
for a given period of time than workers hired at  younger ages. 
Table 2 indicates that the age of hire also  is an  important factor in 
real wage growth.  According to the regression, workers hired at  later ages 
often experience greater real wage  growth than workers hired at  younger 
ages.  In  addition, wage  growth for female office workers and  saleswomen at 
particular combinations of  age and age of  hire often exceeds that of  their 
male occupational counterparts. 
A reduced form regression can help illustrate the shape of  the age— 
profile of  the present expected value of  compensation.  This regression 
relates the log of  the present expected value of  compensation (calculeted 
using the inital wage, the  q(  ,  )  function, and the p( ,  )  function),  to a 
set of  year  dummies and a  polynomial in age.  The exponent of  the 
coefficients of  this polynomial in  age multiplied by  their respective 
variables indicates the shape of  the age—present expected value of 
compensation profile.  Figure 1 presents this profile for each  of  the five 
sex—occupation group normalized by the age 40  level of this profile.  Notice 
that each of the normalized profiles of  present expected compensation rises 
at early ages at a decreasing rate,  suggesting, as indicated above, that 
productivity rises with  age at  these ages.  In  addition, each of the 
profiles, except that of  saleswomen, declines a decreasing rate in old age, 
suggesting that productivity declineswith  age at these ages for at least 
the other sex—occupation groups. —12— 
problem for estimating the age productivity relationship, the parameter a1 
is normalized to unity.  With this normalization and using (12),  equation 
(11)  can now  be  expressed as: 
(11')  catj 
— logB + log[X1(a)  +  023(2(5)  + a3X3(a)] + 'atj 
where X1(a), Xp(a), and X3(a) are the respective sums on  the right hand  side 
of (12).  Equation (11')  can be estimated nonlinearly.  Since time enters 
only through the intercept term log6, data for workars hired in different 
years can be  pooled by  simply entering year dummies. 
The assumption of  myopic expectations may  not be  justified.  An 
alternative assumption is that firms expect that the value of  the marginal 
revenue product of  labor will revert to a  value 6*  next  period and stay at 
that level in the future.  Under this assumption we  have: 
t+75—a 
(13)  ca,t,j — log[6h(a,s)  + 6*  E  q(a+s_t,a)h(a+s_t,a)R5t]  + Ca  t,j  s—t+l 
In  principal, equation (13) can be estimated nonlinearly to  recover values 
of  6*,  the 6 as well as 2  and 03.  In  practice, parameter estimates of 
this model did not converge because of  colinearity of  the right hand  side 
variables in  (13).  The nonconvergence occurs even if  one models h( ,  ) as a 
gradratic, rather than a cubic function of age. 
- 
Section III.  The Data and Emoirical Implementation 
The large firm's data used in this study are earnings histories 
covering the period 1969 through 1983 of  workers employed in the firm at —13— 
some time during the period 1980 through 1983.  The workers ste classified 
into three rather broad occupation and sex groups: male office workers, 
female office workers, salesmen, saleswomen, and male managers.  There are 
too few female managers ro warrant their analysis.  Unfortunately, there are 
no  additional demographic variables that could be  included in the analysis. 
The firm has a defined benefit plan with  a  fairly complex set of  age— 
and service—related benefits.  The benefit formula is a percent of  earnings 
formula in  which the basic retirement annuity equals a percentage rate times 
the number of  years of service for workers with  fewer than  26 years of 
service.  For those with  more service, the formula equals 25  times the 
former percentage rate,  plus the additional service beyond 25 times a lower 
percentage rate.  The baaic benefit is offset by the amount of  Social 
Security benefits the firm predicts the  worker will receive.  The predicted 
Social Security benefit is derived from another age— and service—related 
formula unique to the firm. 
The pension plan's  normal retirement age is 65,  and its early 
retirement age is 55.  For workers who retire after the early retirement 
age, but before the normal retirement age,  there is a special early 
retirement benefit reduction table that is based on  the workers' age and 
service.  Workers who terminate employment before age 55 are not eligible 
for the quite generous early retirement benefit reduction rates and face 
instead actuarially reduced benefits.  Another very  important penalty for 
terminating  before the early retirement age is that for workers retiring 
after the early retirement age have their Social Security offset deferred 
until they reach age 65.  These provisions of  the firm's pension can  produce 
quite substantial  vested pension accrual at age 55,  but rather modest —10— 
departing the firm is high, pR  will be  much less thsn unity, and a value of 
C*(a+l) in excess of  C*(a) is consistent with  positive values of  v(a). 
The formula for changes in productivity with age is given in (10).  In 
some cases one can read the age—productivity relationship from the slope of 
the age—present expected compensation profile, C*(a), and knowledge that 
pR<l.  For example, productivity is constant with age in  the range of  ages 
over  which the C*(a) profile is flat.  One can also tell that productivity 
rises with  age over ranges in  which C*(a) is rising, but at  a decreasing 
rate; the intuition here  is that a  positive, but flattening slope of  C*(s) 
means that the immediate positive slope of C*(a) (the difference in  C*(a+l) 
and C*(a)) is due to v(a+l) exceeding v(a), rather than to  later marginal 
products exceeding v(a).  If C*(a) is increasing, but at an  increasing rate, 
one can not say whether productivity at age s+l exceeds or  falls short of 
productivity at  age a.  Similarly, one can tell that productivity delines 
with  age over ranges of ages in which C*(a) declines with  age at a 
decreasing rate; however, if  C*(a) declines with  age at  an increasing rate, 
one can not tell whether productivity is decreasing or increasing with  age. 
Returning to the general case, ecuation (8)  can be transformed into an 
econometric relation by  appending s multiplicative error term, eC5,t,j, 
where  the subscript j  references the individual worker.  The error term can 
be viewed  as s worker—specific productivity factor.  Its inclusion in  the 
model means  that workers hired at the same age in the same sex—occupation 
category may have different initial salaries.  Hence, the model permits 
worker heterogeneity as well as  selectivity  based on  the  a,t.j5  While 
workers hired at  psrticular ages, or in  certain years, may be  more or  less 
productive  than workers hired at  other ages or in other years without —11— 
biasing the results, the model does require the saae wage—growth  contract 
and the same departure rates for all wotkers within a sex—occupation group. 
Taking logarithms of  the resulting expression yields: 
(11)  ca,t,j — logO ÷ logH(a) + 
6a,t,j 
Tn  (11), Ca,t,j is the logarithm of  C(a,t) for worker j who is age a in year 
t.  While h(  ,  )  can,  in principle, be  parameterized as  a function of 
service as well as age, in  ptactice, the resulting cummulative age and 
cummulative service vatiables are too colinear to estimate separate age and 
service coefficients.  Hence, I parameterize the productivity function h( 
as simply a cubic function of  age,  and acknowledge that the age— 
productivity results reported below confound service—productivity effects. 
Letting h(k,a) —  a1k  +  c2k2 +  a3k3, H(a) can be  written as: 
t+75—a  t+75—a 
(12)  H(a) — °l E  q(a+s_t,a)(a+s_t)R5t  +  S  q(a+s_t,a)(a+s_t)2R5t 
a—t  s—t 
t+75—a 
+03 E  q(s+s_t)(s+s_t)3R5t 
s—t 
One can not separately identify all four of  the parameters  in (11)  and 
(12),  l' °2 and 03.  To see this substitute from (12)  into (11) and 
divide both  sides of the resulting expression by  °i; observe that the 
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































productivity profile is quite similar to that of the male office  workers, 
both the salesmen and saleswomen  productivity profiles peak a few years 
later than those of office wotkers, hut their rate of decline with age is 
quite similar.  Productivity for male managers peaks at age 43; by  age 60 
productivity is less than one third of peak productivity, and productivity 
actually  becomes negative after age 62. 
In four of the diagrams productivity  exceeds total compensation  while 
the worker is young and then falls below total compensation; in the 
remaining case, that of  salesmen,  the relationship of  compensation and 
productivity is quite similar to the other four groups,  except after age 61 
when productivity again exceeds compensation.  Except for the kinks in  the 
age—compensation profiles associated with pension accrual, the age— 
compensation  profiles and age—productivity  profiles for salesmen and 
saleswomen are very  close to one another at each age.  This is what  one 
would predict since salesworkers in this firm are paid,  in  large part, on  a 
commission  basis. 
In contrast, to the results for salesworkers, one might expect the 
weakest connection between annual earnings and annual productivity among 
male managers.  Figure 4 indicates this is indeed the  case.  At age 35 
productivity for male managers exceeds total compensation by  more than a 
factor of two,  while compensation is over twice as high  as productivity by 
age 57.  The discrepancies between total compensation and productivity at 
these ages are somewhat smaller for office workers, but still quite 
important.  For example, age 35 total compensation for female office workers 
is $22,616, while age 35 productivity is $33,604.  In contrast, age 57  total 
compensation is $42,526, although productivity is only $28,117. —23— 
The results depicted in Figures 2 through 6 are not sensitive to the 
inclusion of pension accrual in total compensation; if one ignores pension 
accrual in the estimation, the age—earnings  end age—productivity profiles 
have tha same relative shapes as those presented.  Of  course, the age— 
earoings profile does not  exhibit the kinks of  the age—total compensation 
profile sioce these kinks atise from pension accrual.  In the absence of 
considering  pension accrual, one csn also use the data on  workers hired 
prior to 1970.  While the initial  wage of  those hited prior to 1969 is not 
reported, thIs  wage  can be  inferred  based on  the wage observed in  1969 and 
the u( ,  )s;  i.e.,  one can inpute  backwards the wage at  the initial age of 
hire,  The results  based on  this larger  data set are again extremely similar 
to those presented in Figures 2 through  6. 
As indicated in Figures 7 through 16 which present compensation and 
productivity profiles at  3 percent and 6 percent interest rates,  the general 
shapes of  the age—total compensation  profiles and age—productivity profiles 
are also insensitive to the choice of interest  rate.  For example, compare 
the 3 percent snd 9 percent compensation and productivity profiles of  female 
office workers in  Figures 13 and 14.  Since the present value of  these 
profiles always equals $500,000, the profiles assuming a 9 percent interest 
rate are initially  higher than those assuming a 3 percent interest rate. 
The percentage differences  between the two profiles is slightly larger at 
early and late ages, assuming a  9 percent, rather than a 3 percent interest 
rate;  but since the initial levels of the profiles in  Figure 14 are higher, 
the absolute differences  between compensation and productivity are 
considerably  larger.  The age at  which productivity of  female office workers 









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































age is roughly 50  assuming a 3 percent  intereat rate;  it is roughly 48 
aasuming  a 6 percent  intereat rate; and it is roughly 45 (ignoring  the 
vesting  kink in the compensation profile)  assuming an interest rate of 9 
percent. 
Another  concern is the extent to which  the profiles described  here  as 
age—productivity  profiles  confound service—produotivity  effects. 
Unfortunately,  the colinesrity between  cumulated  service and age variables 
precludes  modeling  the h( ,  )  function as a continuous  function both  of age 
and age of  hire.  An  alternative way to explore  this issue is to model  h( ,) 
as  depending  only on age, but to estimate the model  separately  for workers 
hired  at  different  ages.  If  one estimates  the model  separately  for those 
hired  prior  to age 35 and those after age 35,  the resulting  general shapes 
of  the productivity  profiles are quite similar  to those based on the entire 
sample.  The post—age  35 profiles  are indeed  very  similar, while  the pro—age 
35 profiles  exhibit a steeper decline in  productivity  with age, with 
negative  predicted  productivity  after roughly age 55.  This  prediction  of 
negative  productIvity  late in the work  span  may simply  represent a poor fit 
in the tail  of the estimated polynomial. 
Section V.  Conclusions  and Suggestions  for Additional  Research 
The findings  that productivity decreases  with  age must  be viewed 
cautiously.  Contrary  to what  has been  assumed,  it may be that  some workers 
within  a sex—occupation  category receive different contracts  than  others. 
Suppose that  within  a sex—occupation  categor'  there are A and B type workers 
and that A type workers receive contracts  with  steeper compensation  profiles 
than  B type  workers.  Also assume that A type workers have smaller values of —25— 
q(  ,  )  than  B type workers.  If the composition of  workers remaining  with 
the firm changes,  the estimated  p(  ,  )  and q(  ,  )  functions would  differ 
from those for either A or B separately  or from  those that would  arise  if 
the separate p(  )s and q(  ,  )s  for A end B  were averaged using constant 
weights.  As a consequence,  the age—productivity  profile derived  using  the 
method  presented here  could  differ from  either the profile  for group A 
workers  or the profile for group B workers.  Similar biases  may ariae  if  the 
composition  of type  A and type B workers among new  hires  changes as  the age 
of hire increases.  These potential biases need  to be explored more formally 
as does the possible bias  arising from  assuming static expectations  of 
overall worker productivity. 
These concerns notwithstanding,  the results are fairly  striking. 
Productivity  falls with  age, compensation at first lies  below  and than 
exceeds productivity,  and the discrepancy  between compensation  and 
productivity  can be very  substantial.  Interestingly,  there is much  closer 
correspondence  of  productivity  to compensation  for amlasworkera,  who are 
compensated  more on  a spot market basis, than  for other types  of  workers. 
Also,  the relationship of  productivity  to compenaation  is  weakest  for male 
managers,  who, one would expect, are most likely to be hired  on a contract 
rather  than  a spot market basis. 
In  addition to  confirming  contract theory, the results lend  support to 
the bonding  wage  models of  Becker and  Stigler  (1974) and Lazear  (1979,1981). 
In contrast, the reaults contradict  the predictions of the standard  Mincer— 
Becker  human  cmpital model  in which workers receive more  than they are worth 
when young and less than  they are worth when old.  They  also  are at  odds 
with the eaaertion of  some efficiency wage  models  that workers  receive their 
marginal  product on an  annual basis. —25 - 
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